


<^ 




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°*v 2 D I S U N I O N 

u 
^ AND 

ITS RESULTS TO THE SOUTH. 

A Letter from a Resident of Wasldngton to a friend 
in Soutli Carolina. 



WASHiNaTO^-^, February 18, 1861 

, Esq, 

Charleston, South Carolina. 
My Dear Sir : 

Events are pressing rapidly upon us, and the dreadful calamity 
wHcli all should deprecate, witli all its attendant evils, appears to be 
almost inevitable. To me it seems that distress, ruin, and a permanent 
blight to the general prosperity of all the States, North and South, 
must follow the disruption of the Union, and with such consequences 
that I look upon it with absolute dismay. My feelings and procliv- 
ties are southern, warmly and sincerely so, but nevertheless I can- 
not but regard the whole proceedings of the South in this matter 
as rash, injudicious, and unadvised. No one can more strongly con- 
demn and deprecate the fanaticism of the North, and the obnoxious 
and irritating course they have pursued for years, which has produced 
the present state of feeling at the South, and which has been the proxi- 
mate cause for the existing lamentable state of affairs. Their press, 
their pulpits, their halls of Legislature, and their stump speeches, have 
all poured out the most gross vituperation and falsehoods as regards 
the South, and this constant sprinkling of vitriol on us has, more than 
any actual and practical wrongs and injuries, produced the present 
evils. Still, however, in justice to the North, it must be said that the 
offending parties there form but a comparatively small portion of the 
people, and that the great body of the community are sound on south- 
ern rights, and utterly condemn the violence and invective, as well as 
the unfriendly legislation, which has been adopted in some of the 
States. 

But is disunion any remedy for the evils and wrongs of which the 
South complain ? Does it give us the Territories ? Does it restore 
our fugitives ? Does it arrest the abominable devices of the ultra 
Abolitionists of the North? Or will it in any way tend to diminish 
' '^Q causes of complaint ? On the contrary, it will aggravate them all 

Ji. Polkinhorn, printer, Washington, D. C. 



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2 . 3J^ 

in a most fearful ratio, besides entailing on us otliers of a more formidable 
and deplorable character from wliicli we should otherwise, m the 
Union, have been exempt. 

The election of Mr. Lincoln has been the event which has precipi- 
tated the crisis, and it is the ostensible reason put forward for the 
secession of the cotton States. 

The selection of any citizen, legally qualified for the office of Presi- 
dent, and legally elected under the provisions of the Constitution, is 
certainly no jiist cause for disunion, and that this reason is a mere pre- 
tense becomes more apparent when all the circumstances of his election 
are taken into view. In consequence of the division in the ranks of 
his opponents, and the running three separate candidates against him, 
he was elected by but a little more than one-third of the voters of the 
United States, and the new Congress would have had a decided and 
controlling majority in both Houses against him, with the Supreme 
Court perfectly sound and conservative on the question of Southern 
rights. What, then, had the South to apprehend as to their rights in 
the Union, and under the Constitution, even with a Eepublican Presi- 
dent, when they knew he came into power against the votes of two- 
thirds of the people, and the legislative and judiciary branches of gov- 
ernment sound on the subject of Southern rights, and able and willing 
to check the first obnoxious movement against those rights, with an 
opposition Senate controlling all his appointments, and with the addi- 
tional fact that all the offices in the South, judges, district attorneys, 
marshals, collectors, postmasters, etc., must necessarily be filled by 
southern men? Under these facts and circumstances, the South had 
every advantage in fighting for their rights in the Union, with the 
moral certainty of success, instead of the uncertain and dangerous mode 
of fighting for them aut of the Union, with all the drawbacks and dis- 
advantages attending this latter mode. 

When the South complains of the hostility of northern sentiment 
against their rights and interests, does it ever occur to them that whilst 
the slave States gave what may be considered as a unanimous vote 
against Mr. Lincoln, the free States gave six hundred thousand more 
votes against him than the aggregate vote of the entire South, and that 
the seceding States, by their recent action, have cut themselves loose 
from this host of firm and steadfast friends in the free States, who have 
always so faithfully and steadily fought the battles of the South, 
through evil and through good report, in their respective localities? 

In view of the above facts and circumstances, we must look else- 
where than to the election of Mr. Lincoln for the real motives which 
have produced the recent disunion movements at the South, and I 
think thoy will be found to be — 

1st. A desire and intention to reopen the African slave trade. 
2d. A belief that a separation would build up the South as a great 
commercial community ; and, 

3d. An overweening opinion of the power of King Cotton, which, 
in a separate Confederacy, it is imagined would be the element and 
foundation for vast wealth, great prosperity, and influence over the^ 
great nations of Europe, as well as the North ; or, as some southern 



orators express it, ''As the means by which wo can l)ring the world 
to their knees before ns." 

Let us, then, examine these different issues. 

First, as regards tlie Alrican slave trade. In South Carolina this 
undoubtedly had an extensive influence; not so much, but still consid- 
erable, in Georgia, and more or less in all the other cotton States. It 
is, however, already exploded, for it is quite evident that a large ma^ 
jority in the cotton States are opposed to it. It is strange, however, 
that it should have ever been seriously entertained by any reflecting 
man, when it is evident that the whole civilized world would oppose 
the measure, and it would lead to an immediate collision with England, 
if not with other foreign nations, (to say nothing of the North,) who, 
by force of arms, would have put down the traffic. Still the plan was 
openly advocated by an influential portion of the public press at the 
South, which is a clear indication that it must have had a very con- 
siderable support in the community, and also that it had undoubtedly 
a very stimulating effect on the secession movement. 

Second. That the separation of the cotton States may somewhat in- 
crease the commerce of those States is possible, but that it will do so 
very materially is a fallacy apparent to all who have studied the ques- 
tion, or who are familiar with the course of trade in this country, the 
existing relations between the North and the South on the subject, and 
the great interests that influence and govern these relations. 

It is one of the popular fallacies of the southern mind that it is owing 
to the Union that the North, and particularly New York, furnishes 
them with so large a portion of the foreign articles of consumption. 

The time was when both Boston and Philadelphia were greater com- 
mercial cities than New York, and in our colonial days even NeAvport 
possessed a larger commerce. The same causes that make New York 
the principal source from which the South obtains the great bulk of 
its foreign supplies, have made Philadelphia and Baltimore almost 
equally, and even Boston to a great degree, in a like manner dependent 
upon her. 

"What is there then that now prevents and has heretofore prevented 
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and 
New Orleans from making their own foreign importations to the full 
amount of their respective wants ? Simply because they find by expe- 
rience that they can get those supplies better, cheaper, and in larger 
assortments in such an immense entrepot as New York, than in a smaller 
and more limited market or by direct importations themselves. 

A southern trader can go to New York and find there the most ex- 
tensive and varied assortment of every description of merchandize from 
every quarter of the world, imported in large quantities, under the most 
favorable circumstances both as to original cost and importing charges, 
and of course saleable at the lowest possible price. 

It is, however, asked how New York has become possessed of these 

.advantages over other cities, North and South? Various and obvious 

reasons exist for it : one of which is the immense territory with its 

teeming and increasing millions, to whom it is the most natural and 

iccessible point for drawing their supplies of every kind, and at the 



same time the readiest and the cheapest outlet for the immense produc- 
tions of those same millions, through its system of internal improve- 
ments by railroads and canals, which bring it in the most direct and 
economical connection with the great Western, North-western, Lake, 
and even the Middle and Border States. 

New York is thus the point where the natural course of trade centers, 
to and from the above States, both for their supplies and the sale of 
their surplus productions, and which is the great basis for its immense 
commercial and financial operations. 

The system is now so firmly established, and of such gigantic dimen- 
sions, that it cannot be changed or diverted even by the neighboring 
northern cities, still less by those of the South. 

The large scale on which business is transacted in New York gives 
them great advantages over other cities, on the same principle that a 
wholesale dealer can under-sell a retailer. 

A division of labor is the great secret of cheapness in manufactures. 
It requires thirteen different processes to make a pin, each of which 
is performed by a different workman ; but if one workman had to per- 
form all these processes, the pin would cost three, four, or five-fold what 
it does^ now. The principle of this division of labor has been intro- 
duced into the great commerce of New York. One importer will con- 
fine his business and attention exclusively to cloths, another to flannels, 
another to hosiery, another to shawls, another to bonnets, another to 
artificial flowers, and so to the end of the chapter. It may readily be 
supposed, dealing thus on a great scale in one article, that the dealer 
can obtain them in foreign countries on the very lowest terms, and that 
the proportional expenses of importation are less than when imported 
in smaller quantities, and thus avoid the disadvantages under which an 
importer would labor who attempted various assortments of different 
kinds of merchandize from as many different nations or ports. 

Take one practical example of this division of labor in the way of 
importation. There is one house in New York, the agent, or very pro- 
bably the partner, of a very extensive manufacturer of shawls in France, 
whose annual importation of that article, to which his business is ex- 
clusively confined, exceeds a million of dollars. They only aim to sell 
these shawls at a price which, after covering freight, insurance, interest 
agency, expenses and charges in New York, will leave the lowest net 
price at which they are willing to sell those shawls in France — dispens- 
ing entirely with the importer's profit. 

It is very evident that a shopkeeper in Charleston can buy shawls 
from this importer on better terms than from any importer in Charles- 
ton ; for the latter must have his importing profit, which the New York 
agency does not expect nor charge, to say nothing of the fact that the 
proportion or per centage of importing charges, including commissions 
to an agent purchasing in Europe, must necessarily be greater on an 
annual importation of $10,000 or $20,000 than on a milHon of dollars. 

Making the ports of the South free or establishing a much more mo- 
derate tariff than might exist at the North, would make no relative dif- 
ference in this matter ; for on the principle that the Confederacy of the 
cotton States was established and acknowledged by the North and by 



European Ucatlons, and friendly relations existing, foreign goods im- 
ported at the North and reshipped to the South, would not be suhject 
to any duties under the northern tariff, but could be taken from the 
bonded warehouse just as they are now, for reshipment to Cuba, or 
Mexico, or South America, free of any duty, and would enter southern 
ports by paying the same duties as if imported direct from Europe, 
for we will not suppose the South would be so silly as to impose a 
heavier duty on the same articles when imported from the North than 
when imported from foreign ports. This would be compelling their 
citizens to buy at the dearest and not at the cheapest point, without the 
least corresponding benefit either by the protection of home manufac- 
tures or by an increase of revenue. 

Independent, however, of all the above considerations, in order to 
build up and maintain a heavy commerce, there must be a correspond- 
ing population as consumers. New York is the natural point of supply 
for foreign productions for more than one-half of the whole population 
of the entire Union, exclusive of the supplies now furnished to the 
cotton States. 

The principal southern ports, particularly New Orleans, have always 
made very considerable foreign importations, but let us suppose that 
the cotton States, as a separate confederacy, made their foreign impor- 
tations to the full extent of their own consumption — how far would 
these additional importations, over and above what they have usually 
imported, go towards building up and maintaining a large commerce ? 
More particularly, how far would it increase the commercial operations of 
any one southern city, when it would necessarily be divided between 
Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, New Orleans, Galveston, &c., &c. ? If 
Charleston monopolized her full natural share of foreign importations it 
would only be to the extent required for the consumption of the popula- 
tion of South Carolina, which, exclusive of her negroes, is less than 300,- 
000, about the population of Baltimore, or Brooklyn, one of the suburbs 
of New York. Savannah, of course, would import for Georgia, and 
New Orleans for Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and a large portion 
of Alabama. It is therefore evident that the cotton States, even if 
they would import all their foreign supplies, would not build up a 
commercial community of any magnitude ; and when, under the exist- 
ing facts and circumstances, it is very evident that the North would 
still be their importers to a very great extent, it is rendered pretty 
certain that the expectation of becoming a great commercial people is 
a fallacy. 

But the South say that not only do the North at present furnish 

most of their foreign articles, but they likewise supply a much 

greater amount in their own productions and manufactures. There is 

no doubt that the value of domestic productions furnished by the 

northern and middle States to the cotton States, is far greater than that 

of foreign goods, and the same cause exists, viz : that the South can 

;^ get those domestic supplies from their sister States much cheaper than 

\ they can from any other quarter. Nor will a separate confederacy 

\ alter this state of things, except so far as a duty may afford protection 

and enable the South to produce such supplies at home. 



6 

But Avhat are the supplies made and produced in tlieir sister States 
that the South receive from thence which they can, under any circum- 
stances, get cheaper from Europe or elsewhere ? The cotton States 
have to purchase from other States a great deal of food for man and 
beast, none of which can isJie. get elsewhere on near such favorable 
terms. Horses, mules, oxen, sheep, hogs, plows, harrows, hoes, 
shovels, and all other agricultural utensils; cotton gins and machinery of 
all kinds ; harness of all kinds ; hats, shoes and boots, not only for the 
black population, but also the finer qualities for the whites ; vehicles 
of every description, from the luxurious private carriage to wagons, 
carts, and drays, down to the wheelbarrow ; household furniture of 
all kinds, from the rich sofa to the kitchen table and chair ; tubs and 
buckets and wooden ware of all kinds ; brushes and brooms ; paints, 
oils, nails, soap, candles, and a thousand and one other articles of com- 
mon and daily use are all supplied from their sister States at a 
much less cost than they can possibly be procured from Europe. 
The mere additional cost of freight across the ocean would add 
greatly to the cost on most of these articles. 

Any duty that might be levied upon these articles coming from the 
North would, as already observed in regard io foreign goods, make no 
relative difference, for the same duty would of course be levied on 
similar articles from Europe, and the only result would be to make 
those articles come dearer to their own citizens, who would be the 
consumers, without at all lessening the ability of the northern or 
western producers to compete successfully with Europeans. The duty, 
it is true, might lessen the consumption of such articles for two causes : 
first, by the increased price ; and second, by increasing the production 
of similar articles within their own borders. The result, then, of a 
more moderate tariff' than exists at the North, or free ports, would only 
enable the cotton States to obtain their supply oi foreign productions 
at a less cost, equal to the difference of duty, without, however, giving 
them any advantages they do not already possess as to the direct im- 
portation of those supplies ; at any rate not to any considerable extent 
above what they now do, and for the reasons already stated. 

If, under a separate confederacy, they intend to adopt the system of 
protection for their flag and impose extra duties of impost and ton- 
nage on European and northern vessels, they, of course, in that mode, 
could secure their own carrying trade for their own vessels, but in the 
system of reciprocity now existing, and so universally adopted by all 
the commercial nations of the world, they would possess no other or 
greater advantages for doing their own carrying trade than they have 
had in the Union ; and without such a system of protection to their 
flag, their carrying trade will be done, as it now is, by European and 
northern vessels, and for the same reasons that now exist, viz : because 
Europe and the North have cheaper labor, cheaper ship-building ma- 
terials, and can therefore build ships cheaper and sail them cheaper 
than the South. That such is the state of the case is so obvious and 
notorious that no arguments or details are necessary on the subject. 

On the basis, then, that two confederacies are permanently estab 
lished, with existing friendly relations, and each pursuing the even 



i 



tenor of its ^v;^y in peace and liarniony, the only advantage the cot- 
ton States will derive from their new organization in connection with 
their trade, commerce, and general supplies, will be, as already ob- 
served, that their European and other foreign supplies will be as much 
cheaper as the difference between the more modei'ate tariff of duties 
they may establish and the higher rates they have hitherto paid under 
the tariff" of the United States. But, as shown above, it will not give 
them the carrying trade, nor change the course of trade as to the mode 
in Avhich they have hitherto received their supplies, nor make them 
draw a less portion of these supplies from other sister States, except 
so far as auyduty levied on these latter may enable them to produce 
similar articles at home. 

This difference of cost from lessened duties would not be very ma- 
terial on the aggregate amount, for the foreign supplies consumed m 
the cotton States bear but comparatively a small proportion to those 
procured from their sister States, and against such advantages would 
be that if they (as no doubt would be the case,) levied duties on do- 
mestic supplies from the North, the latter, of course, would levy du- 
ties on the productions of the South. Some of the productions of the 
South (cotton, for one,) would, no doubt, be admitted free of duty as a 
raw material, but a duty on sugar equal to that paid on sugar from the 
West Indies would at once cut off' entirely Louisiana, Texas, and Flo- 
rida from the northern market, as their sugar could not compete, ex- 
cept under a deferential duty with that from Cuba or Porto Rico, and 
the sugar crop of those States is far greater than would be required for 
the consumption of the new Confederacy. Nor would that sugar be 
consumed even at the South, and the culture of it would have to be 
relinquished, for the foreign article would entirely supersede it, unless 
the new Confederation will adopt the long and much abused doctrine 
of protection, at least so far as that article is concerned, and without 
which, this enormous interest of Louisiana will at once be prostrated 
and ruined. The consumption of sugar in the cotton States, is not 
equal to more than one-third of the ordinary sugar crop of the above 
three States; and the abolition of duty in the other States, would, there- 
fore, leave two-thirds of the crop without a market, even if the cotton 
States did give it a protecting duty. 

It is an error for the South to say or think that they have, in conse- 
quence of the Union, been thus obliged to procure from, and be depend- 
ent on the North, and particularly on the New England States, for so 
large a portion of their domestic supplies, as they have, on New York 
for their/ore(7?i articles, for the Middle and Western and Northwestern 
States, including New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, &c., depend, to a 
very great extent, on the cheap industry of New England for pre- 
cisely the same articles as the latter furnish to the South, and even 
New York herself, with all her immense foreign commerce, draws very 
largely upon the Yankee States for similar supplies, and this result has 
not been brought about by the Union. It is the soil, climate, habits, 
and the most congenial and profitable employment for the respective 
populations of the different sections of the country that leads to this ad- 
vantageous and convenient interchange of the articles of their respect- 



8 

ive production, eacli growing" or making those articles \Yliicli tliey can 
do most advantageously/and the North might, with equal propriety [and 
justice, say that the Union is the cause that has obliged them to be de- 
pendent exclusively on the South for their Cotton, Eice, and Tobacco. 

To express it in the shortest manaer, the main cause of the differ- 
ence in the productions of the two sections, arises from the simple fact 
that the climate of the South is peculiarly favorable for out-door labor, 
and that of the North renders in-door employment indispensable ; and 
this fact controls their respective habits and employments. 

We now come to the item of cotton. 

There is a most overweening opinion at the South as to the power 
of King Cotton, and of the immense influence the cotton States could 
bring to bear hj the command of that great staple. There is no doubt 
it is a most important item in connection with the gi'eat interests of the 
country, but there are other and more important Kings in the United 
States than cotton. There are King Wheat, and King Corn, and King 
Say: there are our minerals, our tonnage, and our manufactures, being 
at least six Kings that have precedence of cotton. If such a necessity 
could possibly exist that one of the above four great agricultural crops 
must be dispensed \nt\x for all the future, and the question was put to 
the people of the United States which one it should be, is there a disin- 
terested man in the country, with intellect to "understand the subject, that 
would not at once say cotton? The derangement and revolution it would 
produce in the business and finances of this and other nations would 
be very severe, indeed ; but the extra supplies of the article that 
could be procured from other quarters, and the substitution of other 
articles for clothing, with a diminished consumption of cotton goods 
from the increased value, would greatly lessen the immediate evil, and 
the stimulant thus afforded to growers of the plant in other countries, 
by the removal of their great competitor, would, in a very short period, 
furnish the required quantity for the consumption of Europe and Ame- 
rica. But let any one trace out the consequences of the immediate 
and future extinction of either of the other three crops so essential for 
the very life of man and beast, and see how much more severe and 
dreadful would be the results to the country. Of course the loss 
of either of these crops, is not a supposable case, .and the com- 
parison is, therefore, merely an imaginary one. The crops of wheat, 
corn, and hay are not only more important to the United States, but 
they are actually of more value in dollars and cents, than cotton. The 
manufactures of the United States are many times greater in amount 
than the value of the cotton, and vastly more necessary and important. 
The minerals, including gold and silver, are also of more value. The 
coal, alone, annually mined and delivered at the points of consumption, 
is not less in value than $60,000,000, and if we take into view the labor 
this coal performs, through thousands of steam engines, locomotives, 
and the ocean, lake, and river steam navigation, the pecuniary value 
of cotton is comparatively small. 

The tonnage of the United States is a more important interest to the 
country than cotton. There are none of the above named six great 
intercuts that the nation could possibly dispense with, and it could not 



possibly recover from tlie permanent loss of either ; but great as would 
be the inconvenience, distress, and ruin that might attend the perma- 
nent loss of the cotton crop, in a few years the circumstances of the 
country and the world Avould accommodate themselves to the de- 
privation. 

But great stress is laid upon the fact that cotton forms such a large 
portion of the means by which the nation pays its foreign indebtedness, 
and the question is asked how could the country otherwise pay for its. 
foreign supplies ? This question might be answered by asking another. 
How did we pay for our foreign importations before Ave grew cotton; 
and before it became such an important item of export? For even as late 
as 1820 our exports of the article were only about one-tenth of what 
they now are, and previous to that period our foreign imports were 
greater, ^^er capita, than at present, for our domestic manufactures 
did not furnish anything like the proportion of our consumption that 
they do at this time. Besides, the trade of a country always regulates 
itself, and no country can continue permanentlj^ to import to a greater 
amount than it has ability to pay for ; and if we were deprivedof cot- 
ton, other means of paying for our foreign supplies would develop 
themselves; or at any rate, the nation, like an individual, would have to 
act upon the homely proverb of cutting its ''coat according to the cloth." 
We see it gravely proposed at the South and, idvocated in some of 
their presses that the planters should unite in ke« ^nxig back the cotton 
crop with a view to extort terms as to the new Confederacy, not only 
from the North but from Europe. The idea that 40,000, 50,000, or 
60,000 cotton producers could or would unite unanimously, or even to 
any considerable extent, in thus keeping back the only article from 
which they derive the means of support, and which the}^ produce ex- 
pressly for sale, is extremely absurd in its very conception. It becomes 
profoundly so when it is recollected that though there are many cotton 
planters that are rich and independent, yet on an average two-thirds 
to three-fourths of their entire crop is anticipated by the planters, in 
advances from their factors or indebtedness for their supplies before 
they gather a single boll of it ; that they have no other means to dis- 

. charge their indebtedness, but by the sale of their crop, nor would they 

v-iy/ without tki& realizing their cotton, have the means or the credit for 
growing another. 

Every one knows how vast and important is the market of the 
United States to the manufacturers of England, and how disastrous 
would be the loss of this market to that nation. If, then, we had any 
difficulty with Grreat Britain, and she was to say to us, that, if we did 
not settle such difficulty on her terms, tha t her people would not sell 
us any of their manufactures, what a broad grin such a threat would 
create throughout the Union, and yet it really is not so absurd as the 
threat of the South that they will not sell their cotton to the North or to 
Europe, unless such terms as they may propose are accepted as regards 
their new Confederacy, The manufacturers of England could as 
readily carry such a threat into operation as the cotton planters, of the 
South, and so could the growers of wheat, corn, or hay. 

The naval power of the country would not be seriouslv injured by 
a2 



01 

tlie secession of tlie cotton States, whose maritime resources and 
means are of very limited extent. It is not necessary to go into 
details to prove the great and overpowering preponderance the rest of 
the Union would possess as to naval power. Let us then suppose, what 
it is to be hoped is hardly a possible case, that the cotton States and 
the rest of the Union are arrayed against each other, and the North 
was to blockade the southern ports and say to the cotton planters that 
they not only may but that they shall keep back their crop. A very 
common answer, made by southerners, to such a suggestion, is, that 
England would not allow it and would come to the assistance of the 
South, as she would not and could not do without cotton. To say the 
least, this is a very bad beginning for an independent government, to 
acknowledge at the outset of their career that they must depend for 
protection on a foreign nation, as well as to admit that the battles of the 
Revolution were fought for nought by the South, and that they were 
willing to thus return to a tacit state of colonial dependence. 

It is, however, a great mistake to suppose that England would inter- 
fere imder such circumstances. The anti-slavery fanaticism of that 
country was never stronger and more extensive than at this moment. 
No ministry, not even the throne itself could stand under the attempt 
to thus interfere for a purely slave Confederacy. Besides, the market 
of the free States is quite as important to England for her manufac- 
tures, as her supply of that portion of cotton she derives from the 
South ; to say nothing of the consequences of a war with the North, 
where she would have to contend with the naval power of the Union, 
but little reduced, as already observed, by the secession of the cotton 
States, with the almost certainty of losing her Canadian provinces 
in the struggle, and which at any rate would require a very great exer- 
tion and powerful force to protect and defend. 

Let us, then, suppose such a blockade to be in force, and the South, 
if they really seriously entertain the idea of keeping back their cotton 
crop ought not to object to it on that account for it would only be 
carrying out their own views. At any rate this would be the only 
possible mode in which the southern plan could be carried into effect 
for holding back any considerable portion of the cotton from regular 
shipment, for no combination of planters can ever be obtained for such 
an object. 

The first result of such a blockade would probably be a struggle 
among the planters by every exertion or device to get their cotton to 
market, by interior routes through the agency of railroads and steam- 
boats. A rise of price in Europe and at the North would of course 
take place, and this rise would promptly stimulate the growth of the 
plant in various quarters of tJie world. The South are correct in their 
opinion that, under a regular and fair competition, India cotton cannot 
successfully compete with American, even if it is furnished at a lower price, 
for the quality of India cotton is still more inferior than the difference 
of price. But the case is different when the question, instead of being 
between Indian and American grown cotton, is between Indian and 
no cotton at all. If the supply of American cotton is cut off, in whole 



11 

or in part, tlic English spinners must, of course, use Indian for tlio 
deficiency, and it is a mistake to suppose India cannot supply tluit 
deficiency after the lapse of a very short period, and a largo portion of 
it immediately. India annually ships a million of hales to China. 
The advance of a few cents per pound would promptly divert this 
million of bales to England. When an entire population of two hun- 
dred millions of people are clothed in cotton, the crop must be so large 
that an extra price will always bring forward a heavy extra surplus 
for a foreign market. China is another great cotton-growing country, 
and if its three hundred millions of people consume cotton in the same 
ratio as the people of the United States, and they are more generally 
clothed in cotton than the Americans, it would require at least ten 
millions of bales annually for their suppl}^, all of which, except the 
portion imported from British India, must be raised at home. Here 
is another source from whence Europe can draw large supplies if cut 
off from the United States. The French are giving great attention to 
the culture of cotton in Algeria, a territory which has been proverbially 
fertile for two thousand years. In 1855 they received in France four 
bales of cotton from Algeria. A late official publication in France 
shows that in the last year they received upwards of a million of 
quintals from that point. The French government are now about 
adopting a regular sj^stem for a vast importation of Asiatics for the 
express purpose of cultivating cotton in that colony. 

In Egypt there is almost an unlimited power for the extensive and 
greatly increased culture of cotton, so soon as an increased price will 
warrant it. 

In the Turkish dominions forty millions of pounds of cotton are 
annually produced, under a very rough and crude mode of culture. 
The advices to the Cotton Supply Association of England state that, 
under an improved system, ten times that quantity can be readily pro- 
cured there. An enhanced price will, of course, soon produce such an 
improved system, nor will they lack aid and pecuniary encouragement 
from England. 

Let us now carry out the idea that either by the supposed blockade 
or by action of the South, either by legislative enactments or by the 
voluntary act of the cotton planters, even one-half of the crop could be 
kept back one year, how completely it would oust King Cotton from 
his imaginary throne. This retention of two million of bales (half the 
crop) would of course very materially advance the price in European 
and northern markets. In thirty days the overland mail would take 
out orders to India, and in four months the first arrivals under these 
orders would reach England, to be continuously followed up to the 
extent of certainl}^ five hundred thousand, and probably of a million 
of bales. The high price would lessen the consumption of cotton goods 
manufactured in Europe and at the North to the probable extent of 
five hundred thousand bales more, which would be only a reduction in 
consumption of less than ten per cent. These two causes, and the 
large stock of cotton always held by the European and American 
manufacturers, would go very far towards providing for the two mil- 
lion bales held back from the crop of the United States, and, at any 



12 

rate, would check any very great revulsion in tlie trade and general 
business of the two countries, and certainly would prevent either Grreat 
Britain or the North being brought to their " knees at the feet of 
King Cotton." 

If, then, the high price of cotton has reduced the consumption, and 
at the same time has attracted extra supplies from India and China, so 
that Europe and the United States have, with more or less inconveni- 
ence, got along without the two million bales thus blockaded or kept 
back at the South, how prostrate would King Cotton be when, after 
the expiration of a year, this reserved stock was let loose on the top of 
another and full crop, thus throwing on the European and American 
markets an extra supply of two million bales more than the consump- 
\ion required, besides the increased production which the high price 
had stimulated in Egypt, Algeria, and India. 

Such a state of things would reduce the price of cotton at least one- 
half, nor Avould the price immediately recover and only gradually, 
for it would require an increased consumption for some years before 
this extra two millions of bales would be absorbed, whose place, during 
its retention, had been supplied from other quarters. 

Such a heavy depreciation in the value of the cotton crop, continued 
for several years, Avould fall with great weight on the planters of the 
South, involving not only a loss of income, but a corresponding depre- 
ciation in the value of negroes and lands whilst these unprofitable 
prices continued, and creating a pressure and a distress there such as 
has never previously been experienced. 

England, it is well known, has long been very restive under her de- 
pendence on the United States for so large a portion of her supply of 
Cotton, and great exertions have been made, and vast outlay of money, 
in order to get rid, at least in part, of that dependence with, every en- 
couragement to these exertions on the part of the Government. One 
of the great and a principal obstacle to an almost unlimited supply 
from India, has been the want of facilities of transportation to the sea- 
ports from the interior ; this obstacle is being rapidly removed by the 
construction of Eailroads for the promotion of which the British Gov- 
ernment has given a conditional guarantee to the extent of £30,000,- 
000 sterling of Eailroad Capital ! 

It is also a significant, fact, and well worthy the consideration of the 
South, as showing the results already achieved by the exertions made 
in Great Britain to procure Cotton from other quarters, that for some 
years, she has been steadily reducing the proportion of Cotton that she 
derives from the United States, and increasing it from other quarters. 
The following is the per centage of Cotton imported into Great Brit- 
ain from the United States and from other countries : 

1845-9 United States, 84 — other countries, 16, 
1850-4 do. 78 do. -22. 

1855-9 do, 76 do. 24. 

The present state of aftairs in the United States has aroused still 
greater attention in England to the subject of Cotton supplies from 
other quarters, and the secession movement will be the means of re- 



13 

doubling licr exertions on the subject, and any necessary portion of tlio 
immense capital of tlie Cotton interest in England Avill be forthcoming 
for the purpose. The South may therefore find, wheu it is too late, 
that England and Europe will at any rate greatly lessen, if they do not 
nearly or quite free themselves from their present dependence on the 
United States for so great a portion of their Cotton ; and whilst King 
Cotton has never been so despotic or so powerful as the South has im- 
agined, even the power that he really does possess may be wrested from 
his grasp. 

The London Times says: "The article can undoubtedly be pro- 
' duced in fifty different regions of the globe, nor is there any reason 
' to doubt that any kind of quality could be imparted to the crop by 
' skill and cultivation. The Egyptian cotton can be applied to all 
' the uses of the American upland cotton ; and the cotton of Algeria 
' is fully equal to any American cotton, except the sea island." 

The Daily News, remarks: "We must lose no time in promotiu"" 
' the growth of cotton, wherever it will grow. The case in in our 
' own hands. Australia and India could give us all we want." 

The Shipping Gazette, says: " This movement of the South will be 
' narrowly watched by all the other cotton growers of the world. 
' One thing is very certain that we ought to foster in every way the 
' produce of our colonies, and of all foreign countries. We are there- 
' fore happy to notice the formation of an association to promote the 
' growth of cotton in Jamaica." 

Other similar extracts might be multiplied, showing what a danger- 
ous game is being played at the South, as regards the poAver, influence, 
and future importance of cotton. 

Among other vaunted commercial advantages which secession is to 
confer on a Southern Cotton Confederacy is the favorable treaties 
it will enable them to obtain or dictate to foreign nations, and to the 
North, principally through the influence of cotton. It is very difficult, 
however, to understand what more favorable commercial relations they 
can establish either with Europe or the North than they already pos- 
sessed in the Union. With the latter they had unrestricted free trade, 
both as to vessels and all their productions, without the intervention 
of any custom-house duties of impost, tonnage, or light money, and 
Europe received their cotton, rice, and timber their only articles of 
export, free of duty, and their vessels on a footing of perlect equality 
wdth their own. What more can they ask, or what more can King 
Cotton procure for them in the way of commercial advantages, from 
foreign nations ; or, what more have the latter to grant ? If any 
changes are to be made, any concessions to be granted, it must be ex- 
clusively from the cotton States to Europe, either by making their 
ports absolutely free, or by establishing a system of a more moderate 
tarift" than what has previously existed, for King Cotton has not the 
power to procure any further commercial advantages for them. 

The preceding remarks are intended to show that none of the great 
objects which have stimulated the secession movement at the South 
will be realized ; that it will not give greater security to the institution 
of slavery or the protection of their negroes ; that it will not give any. 



14 

or if an3^ no material increase to tlieir commerce, nor to tlie nature 
and quantity of their supplies, nor the sources from whence they pro- 
cure them, even admitting that the movement results in the most fav- 
orable manner, not only by a peaceable secession but also by a con- 
tinuance of it, and the permanent establishment of the most friendly 
and amicable relations between the two sections. 

Without any corresponding advantages, then, from the movement, 
the South will suffer many disadvantages by it, even under the con- 
tinuance of friendly relations with the North ; they, in the first place, 
lose the prestige of forming a portion of a great and powerful nation, 
commanding the respect of the world, and too strong ever to be wan- 
tonly attacked or injured by any. even of the greatest nations of the 
world ; whereas, the new Confederacy must principally depend upon 
the negative power of trade and commerce for the friendship, respect, 
and forbearance of foreign nations. 

The maintenance of a separate Government, with all its parapher- 
nalia of executive, legislative, and judicial authorities ; its navy and 
army, fortifications and arsenals ; its diplomatic and consular agents, 
and its costly postal establishment, will entail a vast expenditure, 
which can only be met by impost duties or direct taxation, which will 
necessarily weigh heavy upon the people. So far as the impost duties 
are levied upon European or other foreign productions, the people of 
the South will pay no more than they have heretofore done, nor, in- 
deed, so much, if they establish a moderate tariff; but all the duties 
fhey may levy on the supplies they may receive from the North will 
be an absolute additional tax upon the consumers. It matters not, 
however, how the funds for the heavy expenditure of a separate Gov- 
ernment are to be raised, it must come from the pockets of the people, 
in the shape of an extra assessment beyond that which they were sub- 
ject in the Union, except so far as to the duties on foreign merchandise. 

If there is to be a permanent separation of the cotton States, every 
one ought to wish and pray that it may be peaceable and continue 
with the most friendly commercial and political relations. But when 
we recollect how many points of collision there will be, how many 
causes of irritation would exist, how many great interests there would 
be to arrange between the two sections, and how much ill-feeling and 
ill-blood unfortunately now exists, and all to be aggravated by dis- 
union, it is greatly to be feared that peaceable separation could not 
continue very long ; and civil war once inaugurated in this country would 
put far into the shade all the horrors of all the civil wars of the world 
for the last five hundred years. 

The division of the public property ; the provision for the public 
debt ; the disposition of the public domain ; the pension list ; the navi- 
gation of the Mississippi, (for the great West will never agree that their 
right to the free navigation of that river, and its ingress and egress by 
it to the ocean, shall be held on sufferance at the pleasure of Louisiana;) 
the postal service ; the tariff and the commercial arrangements are 
all points on which great difficulties may well occur, leading most pro- 
bably to bickerings, threatenings, and absolute strife. How dreadful 
and desolating would that strife be to everv State and every section of 



15 

the country ! How blighting to its trade, commerce, finances, and 
general prosperity ; and how difficult it will be to avoid it, with so 
many rash, turbulent, and reckless spirits scattered over the whole of 
both sections, even allowing that the direct rulers of both were most 
favorably and earnestly disposed to the maintenance of peace and 
friendly relations. 

The Almighty never formed a country or a people better calculated 
to live under one government, and who were more mutually and ad- 
vantageously dependent, and whose interests and prosperity were so 
intimately linked and united every way. 

It has been truly said that material interests bind them ; rivers bind 
them ; railroads bind them ; trade binds them ; mutual wants and ne- 
cessities bind them ; the laws of production and manufacture bind 
them ; the ice of the North and the tropical fruits of the South bind 
them ; safety against foreign danger binds them ; the kindred blood 
that flows in myriads of veins binds them ; the most perfect Constitu- 
tion that was ever formed by man binds them ; the memories of the 
past bind them ; the yet unfulfilled destiny of this great nation binds 
them ; a thousand influences, seen and unseen, all conspire to bind 
these States together in indissoluble bonds. 

Let us all then hope that this glorious Union, the hope of the nation, 
and around which so many sacred memories cling, is not yet destined 
to destruction or to go down in blood ; but that calm reflection and 
brotherly feelings, North and South, will rescue it from the surround- 
ing dangers, that our children and our children's children will live in 
union, harmony, and brotherly affection as we heretofore have done. 

Very truly. 



The following from influential British sources will give an idea of 
the views entertained in Great Britain on some of the points discussed 
in the preceding letter : 

AMERICAN INFATUATION CONCERNING ENGLAND. 

From the London Economist, January 2G, 1801. 

There is something truly astounding in the infatuations which seem 
to possess the politicians in the Southern States of America. They 
have not only persuaded themselves into something that has all the 
strength, if not the intellectual loeight of a moral conviction, that the 
cause of Slavery is a holy and sacred cause in which they who suffer 
loss are heroes and martyrs, — but they have also fully persuaded them- 
selves that all who differ from them are the unfortunate subjects of a 
mere fanciful hallucination which the slightest pressure of real self-in- 
terest will dissipate at once. They seem really to believe that England 
is as ready to support them, if they can hut offer her sufficient interested 
motive for doing so, as she would be, for similar inducements, to sustain 
Italy against Austria or Prussia against France. " Cotton is King," 
they cry. " England wants our cotton, and if we can give it her cheap- 
er than she at present gets it, there is nothing Manchester and Liver- 
pool would not do to attain such an end." Accordingly they bestoAV 
fruitless ingenuity on plans for entrapping England into lending them 
the aid of her protection against the Federal Government. The lead- 
ing men of South Carolina and Georgia are said to have hit on the fol- 
lowing scheme : " If the United States Government attempts to collect 
the revenue on foreign imports at the South by placing revenue cutters 
off the different harbors, then the seceding States, not deeming it ex- 
pedient to declare war will pronounce for direct taxation as the exclu- 
sive source of revenue, passing an ordinance to that effect. The For- 
eign Ministers at Washington will then be informed that the ports of 
the Cotton States are thrown open for the entrance of foreign merchan- 
dise free of duty, and that any duties imposed by the United States 
Government are levied contrary to law, and without authority from the 
Southern Confederacy. The revenue question will then be transferred 
from the South to Europe. It will become a question with France or 
England, whether or not it will defend the free-trade rights thus con- 
ferred on its manufacturers against the revenue duties of the Northern 
States. And in such an appeal to British or French cupidity, it is ex- 
pected the national sympath}' for free negroism, will yield to the na- 
tional interest in favor of free trade." 



18 

It is lamcntaUe to see such infatuation as this. Have Soutli Carolina 
and Georgia reall}^ persuaded themselves that mercantile men in Eng- 
land would even wish that their Government should interfere in a strug- 
gle between the Federal Union and the revolted States, — and interfere on 
the side of those whom they deem willfully and fearfully in the wrong, 
simply for the sake of buying their cotton at a cheaper rate ? We 
think' we may safely say that there is not a commercial hody in this 
Kingdom that would endure to see the British Government so faithless to 
its avowed principles of action, so treacherous to its avoioed sijmpathies, 
for the sake of securing a mercantile gain to this Kingdom. It is true we 
do not Avish to see the struggle between the North and the South pro- 
longed. We believe no civil war could equal it in horrors, and we hold 
also that, — if, indeed, all classes among the people of the South are bent 
on separation as they seem to be, and not merely carried away by the 
excitement of the moment, and the urgency of the meaner part of the 
population, — no forcible interference on the part of the North can pos- 
sibly avail. But, assuredly, while the struggle is undetermined, — 
while the Federal Government still endeavors and hopes to enforce its 
authority over the whole territory rightfully subjected to its sway, no 
bribes, however enormous, would induce the English people, — or any 
class among them, however directly interested in the result, — to lend 
its aid to a revolt which they believe to be utterly unprovoked, the re- 
sult of the worst political passions, and likely to end in the general 
degradation of the Southern States. 

These Southern gentlemen seem to tis to have lost all the instincts of 
national honor, and to have lost them so entirehj that they have ceased to 
helieve in their existence elsewhere, when they calculate on any European 
nation talcing a course that would cover it with loell-deserved infamy. If 
there is one rule of national action more than another to which we 
have pledged ourselves deeply, it is the rule of non-intervention be- 
tween revolted subjects and the Government to which they are sup- 
posed to owe allegiance ; — nay we do all in our power to secure the 
adhesion of other European Powers to the same course. Now, do 
these sharp Southerners really believe that England will not only break 
through the rule in their case, and break through it against the whole 
current of their political sympathies, but avow to the world that they 
do it for the sake of gain and gain alone ? Where would England's 
political influence in Europe be after such an act as this ? Would she 
not be set down as unworthy to be heard again in international councils? 
If a private gentleman openly takes a bribe to throw his convictions 
to the winds, would any of these Southern gentlemen deem_ him fit 
company for them ? And if not, it is not at least usual on this side of 
the Atlantic to regard a nation's honor as less sacred than an indi- 
vidual's. 

The truly melancholy side of these strange calculations on the part 
of the Southern States, is the evidence which they give of a completely 
distorted standard of judgment — on all subjects at least that touch the 
one great interest of their political life. They have cried out so long 
that all scruples about slavery are cant and affectation, that they not 
)\\\j believe it, and believe that loe believe it, but they even expect us 



19 

to make a sacrifice of political credit and consistency l)y avowing our 
previous insincerity, and this for considerations tliat would certainly 
never have induced us to interfere in behalf of Hungary or Italy, 
whom we did desire to aid with all our hearts. Sucli, infatuation is 
absolutely apj^lling. It seems to indicate that a kind of monomania 
blinds the Southern States on all subjects closely connected witli tlieir 
cotton and their slaves. We doubt if anytliing loe can say wilf open 
their eyes. But we are at least bound in tlie name of the mercantile 
classes of England to tell them that any proposal to intervene on their 
behalf in the struggle against the federal Oovernment of the Union, 
would be scouted nowhere with more scorn and indignation than in those 
districts of England which ivould benefit most by free trade with the 
United /States. 

THE SUPPLY OF COTTON FOR ENGLAND. 

From the London Spectator. 

There are, in fact, but three countries in the world which offer a 
chance of adequate, immediate, and cheap supply — they are India, 
China, and, perhaps, Brazil, 

In India all the conditions of cultivation are present as fully as in the 
Souther7i States. The cotton soil is of limitless extent. There is labor 
on the spot, cheap, plentiful, and accustomed to the work. There is a 
crop already produced, the extent of which seems but faintly compre- 
hended, even by men whose fortunes depend upon their comprehension. 
India has no statistics, but the broad facts are patent without the aid 
of science. Two hundred millions of human beings are there clothed 
in indigenous cotton. However small the requirements of each man — 
and a population which bathes in cotton clothes twice a day, needs more 
cotton than Europeans are apt to admit — tlie regular supply must be 
inconceivably large. So great is it, indeed, that fluctuations of hundreds 
of millions of pounds between the export of one year and another 
scarcely affect the local price. The normal export to Europe may be 
taken at 300,000 bales. Yet in 1857, this amount, without preparation, 
without any disturbance in the internal trade, without any stimulus, 
other than increased price, rose at a bound to 680,000. Let Manchester 
ponder the extent of a cultivation which, without warning, throws off' 
that quantity as unnecessary surplusage. But if we shall be told, if 
India really produces such supplies, why do they not alwaj'-s reach this 
country ? Simply because the Cotton cannot be carried to the coast at the 
average price of the American staple. The expense of carriage swallows 
up the profit. The instant a rise in price overcomes that one difficulty, 
the cotton is offered in profusion. The staple has three expenditures 
to meet. There is the cultivator's price, say, speaking roughly, l|d. per 
pound ; there is the exporter's profit, little enough always, and there 
is a cost of carriage equal to nearly double the cost price of the fibre. 
Reduce that one item, and the supply, without new factories, without 
waiting for that "regeneration of India "for which Mr. Bazley hopes, 
and of which Anglo-Indians despair, will be ample to supply any va- 
cuum created by disturbances among the slaves. We do not write 



20 

without knowledge, wlien we say that India, the cotton raihuay once com- 
jilete, can emancijjate England at once, from de-pendence on the South. 

The position of China is widely different, but as a neio field it offers 
advantages for beyond those of Australia or the Cape, Its colossal 
deltas contain cotton land almost without limit. Those deltas swarm 
with a population accustomed to toil, working for bare food, and inge- 
nious beyond any Asiatic or African race. The enterprise which in 
Algeria must be wasted on the importation of labor, and in India on 
securing a title to land, may in China be turned at once to the cultiva- 
tion. The Chinaman has no prejudices. Prove to him that cotton will 
pay, and he will grow cotton just as readily as sugar, or tea, or any of 
the products with which he now deluges the world. No demand has 
ever yet surpassed the Chinese capacity of production. If the reduc- 
tion of a dut}'' on tea increases the demand 30 per cent., China sends a 
few more millions of pounds without consciousness even of the differ- 
ence of demand. It is in the great cloacae of the human race, in lands 
where labor is a drug and wages imply only the right to breathe, that 
demands like those of Lancashire for cotton can alone be adequately 
supplied. Let the Manchester men compel Sir Chaeles Wood to fin- 
ish the railway now constructing to Omraotee out of hand, and at any 
cost. Let them at the same time give up vague theories about Indian 
regeneration, and send agents to collect detailed information as to the 
extent of the Indian cotton crop, and in six months they may rest in 
peace, confident that even if the Union be m flames, the conflagration 
can never extend to the cotton-mills of Great Britain. 

Lord Derhy on Secession. 

In the House of Lords, Lord Derby said : " My attention is directed 
to the paragraph (of the Queen's speech) in reference to the threatened 
disruption of the American Union, and to the reception his Royal High- 
ness the Prince of Wales met with in that country. I am quite sure 
there is no one in this country who would view without deep interest 
and regret the disruption of a community which, imder various disad- 
vantages, has procured for its people a prosperity almost unparalleled, 
and a personal liberty and freedom only inferior — for I think it is in- 
ferior — to that enjoyed in this country. But you cannot look at this 
threatened disruption without inquiring to a certain extent upon its 
effects upon this country. A quarrel between the North and South 
can only result in the first instance in consequences the most disastrous 
to the interests of the South ; and unfortunately it happens — I trust it 
will not long be the case — that we have been for too many years look- 
ing too much and too exclusively to that country for our cotton. This 
crisis, therefore, will not be without advantage to this country if it leads 
those who are most deeply interested — for I do not think it is a ques- 
tion in which the government ought to interfere — to a serious consid- 
eration of the best means for promoting, on their own behalf, a supply 
of cotton from other places." [Hear, hear.] 



21 

KING COTTON. 

The pious apothegm, " man proposes, but God disposes," seems likely to meet 
a signal verification in the experiment now making in the southern States to 
strengthen the institution of slavery by introducing it behind the supposed over- 
mastering necessity of the commercial world for a supply of southern j^cotton. 
This vaunted " king" may be dethroned by the very means adopted to enforce 
allegiance to its usurped authority. Providence seems likely to convert the 
zeal of the secessionists into an instrument for giving success to rival cotton 
plantations in other quarters of the globe, and thus subverting a lucrative mon- 
opoly which has long been the main support of the South. We propose to trace 
the operation of the commercial causes, and indicate some of the steps by which 
this result may be brought about. 

The South asserts that England must have its cotton ; that four millions of 
British subjects depend for daily employment and daily bread on a supply of 
this important commodity ; that the cotton manufacture of Great Britain is so 
interwoven with other branches of industry and trade that its forced suspension 
would cause a general unhingement of business, to be followed by extensive 
riots of unemployed and starving workmen, and resulting in the overthrow of 
the Government. It is on this assumption that the Charleston Mercury talks 
in this strain : 

" Let the patriots and planters of the South keep back their cotton. In March 
Europe will need supplies. If our ports are blockaded, Europe will find a way to 
open them. We can live — our southern people — for we only send a surplus 
crop to market. The cotton States have only need to agree, in confederation, 
and, as an independent power, demand the recognition of Europe. Texas, 
alone, was gladly acknowledged as such, and Great Britain, through her diplo- 
mats, tried her best to keep her from entering the United States Confederacy. 
With all the cotton StattA- united, we can bind the world to pledges of recognition^ 
and even alliance.^' 

This is the fruit of a distempered fancy. The South does not over- 
rate, and we will not underrate, the great importance to British indus- 
try of a regular supply of cotton. British manufacturers and statesmen 
have been for years impressed with this necessity, and have been turn- 
ing their thoughts toward the creation of other sources of supply than 
the United States. No event has ever occurred so calculated to deepen 
this impression, and invigorate the policy of fostering cotton culture in 
other parts of the world as the secession of the cotton States. English 
publicists are already fully alive to the urgent necessity of seeking 
other sources of supply for this indispensable article, and it is certain that 
the secession movement will impart to cotton culture in other regions 
of the globe the mightiest impulse it has ever received. 

The Charleston Mercury says, that if the southern ports are block- 
aded, " Europe will find a way to open them." Even if England should 
undertake to relieve a blockade of the southern ports, the danger to 
ships and cargoes would be so great, and the rates of marine insurance 
so high, that the railroad routes would probably be preferable. At any 
rate, England will not undertake a war with the United States, and 
put at hazard her colonies on their northern frontier, as a means of get- 
ting a supply of cotton, when she may be certain of it, without this 
extreme resort. The necessity of the South to sell is as imperative as 
that of England to buy. The sale of this crop is the means by which 
they live ; and England only needs to stand still, and she will get her 



22 

sup]ily of cotton by railroads through the northern seaports. 

The result will be, that England will continue to buy southern cot- 
ton, but the addition to its cost, consequent on more expensive trans- 
portation, will- operate as a bounty on the production of cotton 
elsewhere. That the revolution, into which the cotton States have so 
precipitately and carelessly plunged, will be instrumental in building 
up successful rivals in other parts of the world, and undermining their 
main stay and support. The new impulse given to private effort, the 
fostering care of the British government, and the indirect bounty con- 
ferred by these southern troubles, will surmount the obstacles that have 
thus far obstructed the cultivation of cotton in Brazil, Egypt, and the 
East Indies ; and the South will find, too late, that they have hoisted 
their own petard. 

The following extract from the fourth number of The Federalist, 
written in 1788, by Mr. Madison, may be read with profit at the same 
time, by those who see no evils in a broken confederacy : 

" We have heard much of the fleets of Britain ; and if we are wise, 
the time may come, when the fleets of America may engage attention. 
But if one national government had not so regulated the navigation of 
Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen — if one national govern- 
ment had not called forth all the national means and materials for 
forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would never have been 
celebrated. Let England have its navigation and fleet ; let Scotland 
have its navigation and fleet; let Wales have its navigation and fleet; 
let Ireland have its navigation and fleet ; let those four of the constit- 
uent parts of the British empire be under four independent govern- 
ments, and it is easy to perceive how soon they would each dwindle 
into comparative insignificance. 

"Apply these facts to our case. Leave America divided into thirteen, 
or, if you please, into three or four independent governments, what 
armies could they raise and pay, what fleets could they ever hope to 
have ? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succour, and 
spend their blood and money in its defence ? Would there be no dan- 
ger of their being flattered into neutrality by specious promises, or 
seduced by a too great fondness for peace to decline hazarding their 
tranquility and present safety for the sake of neighbors, of whom per- 
haps they have been jealous, and whose importance they are content 
to see diminished ? Although such conduct would not be wise, it 
would nevertheless be natural. The history of the States of Grreece, 
and of other countries, abound with such instances ; and it is not im- 
probable that what has so often happened, would, under similar circum- 
stances, happen again. 

"But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State or 
Confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion, shall aids of 
men and money be afforded ? Who shall command the allied armies, 
and from which of the associates shall he receive his orders ? Who 
shall settle the terms of peace ; and, in case of disputes, what umpire 



23 

sliall decide between them, and compel acquiescence ? Various diffi- 
culties and inconveniences would be inseparable from sucli a situation ; 
whereas one government, watching over the general and common inter- 
ests, combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, 
would be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far m9re to 
the safety of the people. 

"But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under 
one national government, or split into a nimiber of confederacies, cer- 
tain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is ; 
and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that our national 
government is efficient and well administered — our trade prudently 
regulated — our militia properly organizied and disciplined — our resour- 
ces and finances discreetly managed — our credit re-established — our 
people free, contented, and united ; they will be much more disposed 
to cultivate our friendship, than to provoke our resentment. If, on 
the other hand, they find us either destitute of an effectual government, 
(each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient) 
or split into three or four independent, and probably discordant, 
republics or confederacies, one inclining to Britain, another to France, 
and a third to Spain, and perhaps played off against each other by the 
three, what a poor pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! 
How liable would she become, not only to their contempt, but to their 
outrage ; and how soon would dear-bought experience proclaim, that 
when a people or family so divide, it never fails to be against them- 
selves." 



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